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THE PROSECUTOR AND THE PRESS: 
LESSONS (NOT) LEARNED FROM THE 
MIKE NIFONG DEBACLE 
R. MICHAEL CASSIDY* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Former District Attorney Mike Nifong made several statements to the 
media during the Duke lacrosse case that were overzealous and clearly contrary 
to a prosecutor’s dual responsibilities to seek justice and to preserve a 
defendant’s right to a fair trial. Notable among Nifong’s more outlandish public 
comments were his characterization of the rape as “totally abhorrent” and 
“reprehensible,” his analogizing the case to a “cross burning,” his expression of 
personal confidence and satisfaction that a rape had in fact occurred, and his 
criticism of the targets for “refus[ing] to speak to investigators” upon “advice 
[of] counsel.”1 After a hearing, the North Carolina State Bar Disciplinary 
Commission ruled that these comments violated North Carolina State Bar 
Rules of Professional Conduct (N.C. Rules) 3.6(a) (“substantial likelihood of 
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding”) and 3.8(f) (“substantial 
likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused”).2 The 
Commission ordered Nifong disbarred.3 
After the disciplinary hearing, Nifong essentially acknowledged that the 
disbarment sanction was appropriate and agreed not to appeal.4 In all likelihood 
Nifong accepted this sanction because other misconduct charges against him—
for failing to disclose exculpatory DNA evidence that showed the presence of 
multiple unidentified males on the rape kit specimen (in violation of N.C. Rule 
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 1. North Carolina State Bar Disciplinary Commission Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order of Discipline § Findings of Fact (21), (22), (27), (29), (42), N.C. State Bar v. Michael B. 
Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (July 24, 2007). 
 2. N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a), 3.8(f) (2007). 
 3. North Carolina State Bar Disciplinary Commission Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order of Discipline § Order of Discipline (1), Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (July 24, 2007). 
 4. See Aaron Beard, Prosecutor to be Disbarred For Duke Lacrosse ‘Fiasco,’ CHI. TRIB., June 17, 
2007, at 6 (Nifong “acknowledged during sometimes tearful testimony Friday that he would likely be 
punished for getting ‘carried away a little bit’ when talking about the case.”). 
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3.8(d)), and for lying to the court about his compliance with discovery requests 
(in violation of N.C. Rule 3.3(a))—were so serious that they probably would 
have led to disbarment even absent claims of improper statements to the 
media.5 
The lack of an appeal in the Nifong disciplinary case is unfortunate in at 
least one respect—it deprives the Supreme Court of North Carolina of an 
opportunity to clarify the line between permissible and impermissible public 
comment by elected prosecutors during criminal investigations. Several of the 
statements that Nifong admittedly made to the media about the rape 
investigation and that the Commission both alleged and found to be improper 
seem entirely consistent with a prosecutor’s duty to inform the public about the 
priorities of his office, the nature and status of criminal cases, and the reasons 
for the discretionary law-enforcement decisions he has made. For example, 
Nifong was determined to have acted improperly in making a statement to the 
media that the alleged victim’s demeanor at the time of the medical 
examination was consistent with sexual assault,6 in asserting that he might 
consider filing charges against players present at the party who failed to come 
forward with information,7 in stating publicly that a medical examination 
revealed evidence consistent with rape,8 and in revealing to the media that the 
accuser was able “to identify at least one of the alleged attackers.”9 These are 
the very types of statements that prosecutors across this country routinely make 
about pending criminal cases in order to keep their communities informed 
about threats to public safety and the ongoing enforcement activities of 
government officials. Not only might some of these latter statements have been 
permissible under a narrow reading of the pertinent North Carolina Rules, but 
they may have been protected by the First Amendment.10 
Focusing on what Nifong did wrong in the Duke lacrosse case is relatively 
straightforward and has been undertaken by many others. His conduct 
throughout the investigation and prosecution of the Duke lacrosse players was 
egregious and reprehensible. Focusing on what Nifong may have done right in 
the case but was disciplined for anyway is a far riskier and more difficult 
venture. There may have been two “rushes to judgment” in the Duke case: the 
prosecutor’s rush to condemn the students before considering and investigating 
alternative theories of what happened at the lacrosse party, and the 
Commission’s rush to disbar Nifong for very badly mishandling a high-profile 
criminal case. Because Nifong did not raise a First Amendment challenge to the 
 
 5. See Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 219, 230, Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (Jan. 24, 2007); North 
Carolina State Bar Disciplinary Commission Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order of Discipline § Conclusions of Law (b), (d), Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (July 24, 2007). 
 6. North Carolina State Bar Disciplinary Commission Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order of Discipline § Findings of Fact (25), Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (July 24, 2007). 
 7. Id. at (18). 
 8. Id. at (38). 
 9. Id. at (49). 
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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discipline imposed on him for improper statements to the media and because he 
accepted disbarment and waived his right to appeal, the North Carolina 
Supreme Court was deprived of an occasion to clarify the precise contours of 
N.C. Rules 3.6 and 3.8 as they pertain to public comments by elected 
prosecutors. The goal of this article is to use the facts of the Duke lacrosse case 
as a focal point for examining restrictions on attorney speech and to analyze 
those aspects of disciplinary rules 3.6 and 3.8 that may be vulnerable to 
constitutional challenge. 
II 
STATEMENTS TO THE MEDIA: THE PARAMETERS OF RULES 3.6 AND 3.8 
Two ethical rules commonly in effect in most jurisdictions constrain public 
comments made by a prosecutor.11 The American Bar Association (ABA) 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) Rule 3.6 prevents a 
prosecutor from making extrajudicial statements that he knows or reasonably 
should know present a “substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an 
adjudicative proceeding.”12 Model Rule 3.8(f) prevents a prosecutor from 
making extrajudicial comments that “heighten[] public condemnation of the 
accused.”13 The scope and purpose of these two rules are different. Model Rule 
3.6 applies to all attorneys and it is designed to safeguard adjudicatory 
proceedings. Model Rule 3.8(f) applies only to prosecutors and is designed to 
protect the interests of the accused in his reputation and privacy. Although it is 
beyond the scope of this article, Model Rule 8.4(c) (prohibiting conduct 
“involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation”) may also come into 
play in certain circumstances if an attorney knowingly makes false statements to 
the media.14 
 
 11. This article will focus on the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, which have been adopted in whole or in part with some variations by forty-seven states. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (1983). With respect to media comments, the rules in North 
Carolina are substantially in accord with the Model Rules for all relevant purposes. See N.C. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6, 3.8(f) (2007). 
 12. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a) (2002). Some jurisdictions that otherwise follow 
the Model Rules deviate from this “substantial likelihood of material prejudice” standard and forbid 
only attorney speech that poses a serious and imminent threat of material prejudice to the proceedings, 
presumably a heightened threshold that prohibits an even narrower range of speech. See D.C. RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 (2007); ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a) (2007); OKLA. RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 (2007). New Mexico prohibits extrajudicial comments by attorneys about 
pending criminal proceedings that create “a clear and present danger” of prejudicing the proceeding. 
N.M. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 16-306 (2007). 
 13. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f) (2002). 
 14. For example, the North Carolina Disciplinary Commission’s Amended Complaint accused 
Nifong of violating N.C. Rule 8.4(c) by falsely suggesting to the media that DNA results may have been 
inconclusive because a condom may have been used in the attack, when Nifong had already received 
the emergency nurse’s examination report indicating that the alleged victim claimed no condom was 
used. Amended Complaint, supra note 5, at ¶¶ 117–24. The final order of the Disciplinary Commission 
found no violation of N.C. Rule 8.4(c). Transcript of Hearing at 5, Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (June 16, 
2007) (Final Order). 
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Comment [5] to Model Rule 3.6 contains a list of six topics that “ordinarily” 
will be considered “more likely than not” to have a material prejudicial effect 
on a proceeding.15 Essentially, this portion of the commentary creates a 
rebuttable presumption of prejudice when an attorney’s public comments 
concern any of the following six topics: 
[1] the character, credibility, reputation, or [prior] criminal record of a party, 
suspect . . . or witness; 
[2] the possibility of a plea of guilty or the existence or contents of any confession, [or 
the] refusal or failure to make a statement; 
[3] the performance or results of any examination or test or the refusal or failure of a 
person to submit to an examination or test, or the identity or nature of physical 
evidence expected to be presented; 
[4] any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect; 
[5] information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be 
inadmissible as evidence in a trial and that would, if disclosed, create a substantial risk 
of prejudicing an impartial trial; [or] 
[6] the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless there is included 
therein a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the 
defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.16 
Many of the off-limits topics set forth in Model Rule 3.6 are directed at 
public reference to evidence that may turn out to be inadmissible at trial, such 
as witness-impeachment material, forensic tests, and confessions.17 The concern 
is that once such influential material finds its way into the public domain, the 
defendant may not be able to receive a fair trial from an impartial jury even if 
the evidence is later excluded. 
In addition to these off-limits topics, Model Rule 3.6 contains a safe-harbor 
provision that allows public comment by attorneys on specified subjects, 
irrespective of whether they risk prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding.18 After 
setting forth the general prohibition in paragraph (a), paragraph (b) of Model 
Rule 3.6 provides that “[n]otwithstanding paragraph (a),” a lawyer may discuss 
with the media the following seven subjects: (1) “the claim, offense or defense 
involved”; (2) “information contained in a public record”; (3) “that an 
investigation . . . is in progress”; (4) “the scheduling . . . of any step in litigation”; 
(5) “a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information”; (6) a 
“warning” to the public of dangers; and, in a criminal case only, (7) “the 
identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused,” “any 
 
 15. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. [5] (1994). 
 16. Id.; see Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Gansler, 835 A.2d 548, 569 (2003) (reprimanding the 
State’s Attorney for making public comments about a suspect’s arrest, confession, and possibility of 
plea bargain). 
 17. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 (2002). 
 18. Id. 
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information necessary to aid in the apprehension of the accused,” “the fact, 
time and place of arrest,” and the “identity of investigating . . . officers.”19 
Whereas Model Rule 3.6 is directed at public statements by lawyers that 
may prejudice the outcome of an adjudicatory proceeding, a separate provision 
of the Model Rules applicable only to prosecutors prohibits extrajudicial 
communications that would unnecessarily disparage the accused. Model Rule 
3.8(f) (“Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor”) provides that, 
[e]xcept for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and 
extent of the prosecutor’s action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, 
[a prosecutor in a criminal case shall] refrain from making extrajudicial comments that 
have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused.20 
According to the 1994 ABA Report recommending this amendment to 
Model Rule 3.8, the revision was designed to prohibit “gratuitous comments” 
by a prosecutor serving only to increase “public opprobrium” toward the 
defendant.21 Examples of such piling on might include a description of graphic 
details about a particularly gruesome or heinous crime, the display of shocking 
or disturbing physical evidence, or reference to criminal associations or 
uncharged acts of the accused. 
III 
FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS FOR ATTORNEY SPEECH 
Most chief prosecutors at the state level are elected officials, and political 
speech by candidates is “at the core of our First Amendment freedoms.”22 It 
therefore seems beyond peradventure that prosecutors like Nifong have First 
Amendment rights. Although courts at one time condoned the right of the state 
to restrict the speech of public employees,23 this position has since been 
abandoned in recognition that government employees do not surrender all their 
First Amendment rights by reason of their employment.24 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f) (2002). 
 21. STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND 
STANDARDS 295 (2007). 
 22. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774 (2002) (quoting Republican Party of 
Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2001)). Even in Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., Justice Rehnquist 
stated that in order to satisfy the First Amendment, restrictions on attorney speech must be “neutral as 
to points of view, applying equally to all attorneys participating in a pending case”—clearly 
contemplating that prosecutors were protected. 501 U.S. 1030, 1076 (1991) (emphasis added). Whereas 
Justice Kennedy argued that a state may have a more compelling interest in regulating prosecutor 
speech than defense-attorney speech for reasons of power disparities and greater access to insider 
information, he did not suggest that prosecutors are not entitled to First Amendment protection at all. 
Id. at 1056. 
 23. See McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216 (1892) (Holmes, J.). See also the 
concurring opinion of Justice Stewart in Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., in 
which he argued that the First Amendment protects private citizens but does not limit the power of the 
state in controlling its own agents. 412 U.S. 94, 139 n.7 (1973), 
 24. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006). In the context of employment disputes 
(demotion, retaliation, suspension, discharge), the Supreme Court has recognized that government 
employees have only limited rights to free speech in the employment arena. See Connick v. Myers, 461 
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It is important to remember that the allegedly improper comments Nifong 
made to the media—and those for which he was disbarred—were made in 
March and April of 2006, in the middle of an ongoing political campaign. After 
serving over twenty-five years as an Assistant and then Chief Assistant District 
Attorney in Durham County, Nifong was appointed to the District Attorney 
position in April 2005, after his then-boss was elevated to a judgeship.25 Nifong 
had only one year in the head job to prove himself worthy of the office before 
facing his first election. The Democratic primary was a three-way race 
scheduled for May 2, 2006.26 At that time there were no announced Republican 
candidates for the position, and pundits assumed that the winner of the primary 
would win the general election in November.27 The alleged rape occurred on 
March 12, 2006 and the first indictments were returned on April 17, 2006—right 
in the thick of this heated primary battle.28 
There are several different classifications of speech, and each enjoys a 
different level of constitutional protection. So-called “fighting words,” or 
speech that poses a clear and imminent danger to public safety, enjoy no 
protection whatsoever.29 Commercial speech may be regulated so long as the 
government demonstrates a “substantial interest” to be achieved by the 
regulation.30 But when the government seeks to restrain religious speech or 
speech related to a political or public issue, such a restriction must withstand 
“strict scrutiny”; that is, the government must demonstrate that the restraint “is 
 
U.S. 138 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). In Garcetti, the Supreme Court ruled 
that a deputy district attorney could not utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge on First Amendment 
grounds his employer’s alleged retaliation against him for a legal memorandum he wrote in a criminal 
case. 547 U.S. at 424. “[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the 
employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not 
insulate their communications from employer discipline.” Id. at 421. However, where public employees 
are speaking as citizens on a matter of public concern, the First Amendment protects them from speech 
restrictions that are not necessary for the employer to operate efficiently and effectively. Id. This 
functional approach to public employee speech—looking at whether the speech occurred during the 
course of the employee’s duties—was justified by the Supreme Court on the grounds of giving the 
government, as employer, the discretion to manage its operations, and preventing every employment 
grievance from being turned into a First Amendment claim. Id. at 420–22. Of course, Nifong was 
disbarred for his comments, not discharged. There is no indication in Garcetti that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in that case applies outside the limited context of employment decisions. 
 25. Benjamin Niolet, Durham District Attorney Will Don a Judge’s Robe, NEWS & OBSERVER 
(Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 19, 2005, at A1. 
 26. Nifong won the primary, but with a plurality rather than a majority of the votes cast. Nifong 
earned 45% of the votes. His closest contender, another former prosecutor in the Durham County 
District Attorney’s office, was Freda Black. She earned 42% of the votes cast in the primary. Sharif 
Durhams & Eric Frazier, Nifong: Duke Case Will Go On: Incumbent Doesn’t See Win as Vindication for 
Actions in Rape Inquiry, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (N.C.), May 3, 2006, at 1B. 
 27. After substantial adverse publicity against Nifong over the summer of 2006, two write-in 
candidates, Lewis Cheek and Steve Monks, tried unsuccessfully to unseat Nifong in the November 
general election. 
 28. See North Carolina State Bar Disciplinary Commission Amended Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order of Discipline § Findings of Fact (16)–(62), N.C. State Bar v. Michael B. 
Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (July 24, 2007). 
 29. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
 30. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980). 
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(1) narrowly tailored, to serve (2) a compelling state interest.”31 The courts 
entertain a “heavy presumption” that every prior restraint on protected speech 
is unconstitutional.32 
Attorney speech about ongoing cases serves a valuable public function. 
“[T]he subject matter of legal proceedings is often of direct significance in 
debate and deliberation over questions of public policy.”33 At least in the 
context of attempts to regulate the media’s access to judicial proceedings, the 
Supreme Court has stated that “it would be difficult to single out any aspect of 
government of higher . . . importance to the people than the manner in which 
criminal trials are conducted.”34 
Public speech by prosecutors serves several additional purposes not 
furthered by attorney speech generally.35 First, the public has a right to be kept 
informed about how a prosecutor is using scarce public resources, and what 
choices he or she is making about law-enforcement priorities.36 As public 
servants, prosecutors have a fiduciary obligation to apprise their constituents of 
how they are managing the public duties entrusted to them. Second, a 
prosecutor’s comments to the media may serve to promote public safety by 
warning the public of continuing dangers in the community or cautioning them 
about particularly vulnerable activities.37 Third, public statements by 
prosecutors may assist in ongoing investigations by encouraging other witnesses 
or victims to come forward with information.38 Prosecutors often utilize the 
press to request public assistance in catching criminals who might otherwise 
remain at large. Finally, public dissemination of a prosecutor’s activities is 
necessary to fulfill the deterrent aims of the criminal law; unless the public is 
notified about indictments and convictions, other would-be perpetrators may 
not be appropriately dissuaded from engaging in criminal activity.39 
Media statements by prosecutors—particularly while criminal investigations 
and trials are ongoing—pose several significant dangers. Intense media interests 
in criminal proceedings and the powerful effect of modern methods of 
communication can combine to turn previously “local” criminal investigations 
into worldwide public spectacles. A prosecutor’s extrajudicial comments can 
jeopardize a defendant’s right to a fair trial by implanting suggestions of guilt in 
the minds of the public before the charges can be fully and fairly exposed in a 
 
 31. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774–75 (2002); Procunier v. Martinez, 
416 U.S. 396, 411 (1974). 
 32. See Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975). 
 33. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. [1] (1994). 
 34. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980) (holding that the right of the 
press and the public to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment). 
 35. R. MICHAEL CASSIDY, PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS 116 (2005). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. In addition to serving a deterrent function, publicity about ongoing criminal cases provides an 
outlet for “community concern, hostility, and emotion,” which is essential to achieve the cathartic effect 
of retributive justice. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571. 
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court of law, thus undercutting the presumption of innocence to which all 
defendants are entitled. Statements to the media also risk irreparably 
destroying the defendant’s reputation and ability to earn a livelihood. Even if 
the accused is subsequently acquitted of the charges, the taint left by the 
government’s accusations of wrongdoing may never wash entirely clean. Finally, 
media coverage of the prosecutor’s allegations may interfere with a defendant’s 
Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.40 If the government’s theory of its case 
is widely broadcast, the defendant may feel compelled to respond rather than 
remain silent and put the government to its burden of proof. For each of these 
reasons, some curtailment of a prosecutor’s comments to the media may be 
necessary to safeguard the fairness and accuracy of adjudicative proceedings.41 
In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada42 the Supreme Court confronted this classic 
clash of values and set out the permissible contours of ethical restrictions on 
noncommercial attorney speech.43 Gentile was actually two majority decisions. 
Five justices, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, ruled that 
Nevada’s “substantial likelihood of material prejudice” standard satisfied First 
Amendment safeguards.44 Rejecting a facial challenge to Nevada’s disciplinary 
rule, the Rehnquist majority held that a “clear and present danger” need not be 
manifest before a state may constitutionally regulate attorney speech regarding 
ongoing cases.45 The Rehnquist majority ruled that lawyers “in pending cases” 
may be subject to ethical restrictions on speech for which an ordinary citizen or 
the press could not be restricted46 because “membership in the bar is a privilege 
burdened with conditions”47 and because such a restriction may be necessary to 
ensure a fair trial.48 
In the second majority decision, five Justices led by Justice Kennedy ruled 
that the Nevada disciplinary rule then in effect was unconstitutionally vague as 
applied to the petitioner (a criminal-defense attorney) because Nevada’s safe 
harbor allowed an attorney to state “without elaboration” the “general” nature 
of his claim or defense.49 Justice Kennedy believed that this imprecise language 
failed to give the petitioner in Gentile fair notice of what was permitted and 
 
 40. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 41. See generally Scott M. Matheson, Jr., The Prosecutor, the Press, and Free Speech, 58 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 865, 868 (1990). 
 42. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991). 
 43. Model Rule 3.6, prohibiting attorney speech that poses a substantial risk of materially 
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding, was amended in 1994 to comport with Gentile. See MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 (2002). 
 44. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1076. 
 45. Id. at 1074–76. 
 46. Id. at 1070–71. 
 47. Id. at 1066 (quoting In re Rouss, 116 N.E. 782, 783 (1917)). “[A]lthough litigants do not 
‘surrender their First Amendment rights at the courthouse door,’ those rights may be subordinated to 
other interests that arise in this setting.” Id. at 1073 (quoting Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 
20, 32–33 (1984) (emphasis added)). 
 48. Id. at 1073–75. 
 49. Id. at 1048–49. 
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what was prohibited.50 The “swing” vote was cast by Justice O’Connor; she 
joined the Rehnquist majority in approving the “substantial likelihood of 
material prejudice” standard and the Kennedy majority in finding the Nevada 
safe-harbor provision impermissibly vague.51 
Viewed through the lens of Gentile, the discipline of Nifong may seem to 
satisfy First Amendment standards. After all, the pertinent North Carolina 
Rule incorporates the “substantial likelihood of material prejudice” standard 
upheld by the Supreme Court in Gentile.52 But Gentile is far from the Supreme 
Court’s final word on the subject of attorney speech. In its more recent decision, 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, the Supreme Court ruled in another 
closely divided 5–4 opinion that a Minnesota rule of judicial conduct applicable 
to judicial candidates violated the First Amendment.53 The disciplinary rule at 
issue applied both to sitting judges and to practicing attorneys and prohibited a 
candidate for judicial office from “announcing his or her views on disputed legal 
or political issues.”54 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, ruled that this 
judicial canon was a content-based restriction subject to strict scrutiny.55 
Addressing Minnesota’s decision to select judges by election, Scalia noted that 
“if the state chooses to tap the energy and the legitimizing power of the 
democratic process, it must accord the participants in that process . . . the First 
Amendment rights that attach to their roles.”56 “We have never allowed the 
government to prohibit candidates from communicating relevant information to 
voters during an election.”57 “[T]he announce clause . . . burdens a category of 
speech that is ‘at the core of our First Amendment freedoms’—speech about 
the qualifications of candidates for public office.”58 
In White, Justice Scalia rejected the argument that the state’s real or 
perceived goal in “impartiality” could satisfy its heavy burden of justifying its 
“announce” clause under strict-scrutiny analysis.59 If impartiality means 
neutrality toward parties, the regulation was vastly underinclusive because it 
prohibited speech about disputed legal or political issues, saying absolutely 
 
 50. The 1994 amendment to Model Rule 3.6 deleted the words “general” and “without 
elaboration,” which had been found unconstitutionally vague by the Kennedy majority in Gentile. 
 51. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1081–82. 
 52. Id. at 1075. 
 53. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
 54. Id. at 768. 
 55. Id. at 774. 
 56. Id. at 788 (quoting Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 349 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). 
 57. Id. at 782. “The role that elected officials play in our society makes it all the more imperative 
that they be allowed freely to express themselves on matters of current public importance.” Id. at 781–
82 (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 395 (1962)). 
 58. White, 536 U.S. at 774 (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 863 (8th Cir. 
2001)). The “announce clause” is a canon of the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct providing that a 
“candidate for a judicial office, including an incumbent judge,” is prohibited from “announc[ing] his or 
her views on disputed legal or political issues.” Minn. Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) 
(2000). 
 59. White, 536 U.S. at 776–80. 
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nothing about the parties to a dispute.60 According to Justice Scalia, if the state’s 
goal were to select judges with no preconceptions on legal issues, this could not 
be a compelling interest because it would be both impossible and undesirable to 
do so.61 Justice Scalia recognized that lower courts had narrowed the reach of 
the Minnesota announce clause to “disputed issues that are likely to come before 
the candidate if he is elected judge.”62 However, Justice Scalia did not think that 
this limiting construction saved the canon from constitutional infirmity because 
“[t]here is almost no legal or political issue that is unlikely to come before a 
judge of an American court, state or federal, of general jurisdiction.”63 Justice 
Scalia reasoned that if electing judges who have no prior opinions on legal 
issues is not a compelling state interest, pretending to preserve the 
“appearance” of this lack of preconception could not reasonably constitute a 
compelling state interest, either.64 
The Court’s decision in White has provided “enormous momentum” to 
attacks on the ABA’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct, and the state rules 
derived therefrom.65 There is now ample basis for doubting whether Model 
Rules 3.6 and 3.8 could survive a similar constitutional challenge. First, five of 
the nine justices who participated in deciding Gentile are no longer sitting on 
the Court. Even former Chief Justice Rehnquist, who wrote in Gentile that 
membership in the bar entails some sacrifice of the privileges normally enjoyed 
by private citizens, joined the White majority in ruling that members of the bar 
running for office must be allowed to state their views on matters of public 
importance.66 After White, if states choose to select their prosecutors through 
the electoral process, they are going to have to tolerate a certain amount of 
campaign rhetoric (even case-based campaign rhetoric). To paraphrase Justice 
O’Connor’s concurring opinion in White, if North Carolina has a problem with 
overzealous statements made by prosecutors to the media during a reelection 
campaign, it is a problem that the state has largely brought upon itself by the 
manner in which it has chosen to select its district attorneys.67 When core 
political speech is at issue, the First Amendment requires states to give 
“breathing space”68 to the communication of information. 
Moreover, the Rehnquist majority in Gentile did not really apply strict 
scrutiny to Nevada Rule 3.6, at least as that test was later construed and applied 
 
 60. Id. at 776. 
 61. Id. at 777–78. 
 62. Id. at 771 (emphasis added). 
 63. Id. at 772 (quoting Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 229 (7th Cir. 1993)). 
 64. White, 536 U.S. at 778. 
 65. George D. Brown, Political Judges and Popular Justice: A Conservative Victory or a 
Conservative Dilemma?, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1543 (arguing that White has led to the further 
politicization of judicial campaigns, which should be considered a disturbing trend for federalists who 
care about the competence of the state judiciary). 
 66. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1066 (1991); White, 536 U.S. at 788. 
 67. White, 536 U.S. at 792. 
 68. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
272 (1964)). 
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in White. Rehnquist’s opinion in Gentile did not invoke the term “strict 
scrutiny,” nor did it demand an explanation for the restriction that was 
“compelling.” The Rehnquist majority in Gentile simply ruled that states strike 
a permissible “balance” between the interests of the speaker and the state’s own 
interest in regulating the legal profession when they prohibit attorney speech 
that poses a “substantial likelihood of material prejudice” to a proceeding.69 
This is really not strict scrutiny at all. When political speech is at issue, a proper 
application of strict scrutiny requires the state to demonstrate that the 
restriction serves a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly tailored to 
serve that interest.70 The court should not “weigh” the value of the speech, or 
“balance” the speaker’s interest in making public comment against the state’s 
interest in restricting it. 
One reading of Gentile and White might suggest a relevant distinction 
between comments about pending cases and comments involving general legal 
issues likely to arise before a court in the future.71 Under this view, the former 
might be regulated under a standard less exacting than the “clear and present 
danger” test, while the latter may not be. The Court in White appeared to leave 
room to regulate the speech of judicial candidates about litigation actually 
pending before them.72 But this distinction does not survive a close reading of 
White or its progeny, at least with respect to elected prosecutors commenting 
about pending cases or investigations. The respondents and dissenters in White 
relied upon a construction of “impartiality” that would include “open-
mindedness”; that is, the state has a compelling interest in protecting the 
fairness of adjudicatory hearings by ensuring that judges are disinterested and 
willing to remain receptive to competing arguments.73 They argued that the 
Minnesota announce clause furthered this interest in open-mindedness by 
 
 69. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075. 
 70. White, 536 U.S. at 774–75 (citing Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 
222 (1989)). 
 71. Gentile suggests that greater restraint on attorney speech is allowed when a case is ongoing 
than when it is completed. 501 U.S. at 1074 (“[T]he speech of lawyers representing clients in pending 
cases may be regulated under a less demanding standard than that established for regulation of the 
press . . . .”). 
 72. See White, 536 U.S. at 770 (expressing “no view” on whether a judicial canon prohibiting a 
candidate from “promising to decide an issue [in] a particular way” would violate the First 
Amendment). 
 73. Id. at 778, 815 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia recognized that this third definition of 
impartiality might present a compelling state interest in limiting judicial speech during an election, but 
he did not proceed to consider whether Minnesota’s canon was narrowly tailored to further this interest 
because he did not believe that “open-mindedness” was the true purpose motivating the enactment. Id. 
at 778. A judicial candidate in Minnesota may state his position on legal matters—both before running 
for election and after being elected—by writing books and giving speeches. See MINN. CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 4(B) (2000). If impartiality in terms of “open-mindedness” were truly the 
purpose behind the “announce” clause, Scalia felt that such activity would have been limited as well. 
“[A] law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest of the highest order, and thus as justifying a 
restriction upon truthful speech, when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest 
unprohibited.” White, 536 U.S. at 780 (quoting Fla. Star v B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541–42 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
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promoting both an unbiased, disinterested judiciary and the public appearance 
of neutrality.74 
After White, however, several federal courts have struck down so-called 
“pledges or promises” clauses of state judicial codes that prohibited judges from 
publicly stating their position on matters pending or likely to come before the 
court.75 Relying on White, these courts have ruled that the “pledges or 
promises” provision before the court was not narrowly tailored to further the 
state’s interest in an impartial judiciary.76 When a judge stakes out his position 
on a certain legal subject through extrajudicial speech, this may present risks to 
the fairness of adjudicatory proceedings. To secure a fair trial for his or her 
client, a future litigant may have to move to recuse the judge who made the 
statements. Recusal hearings are fraught with costs to the state—including the 
consumption of scarce court time, the risk of error, and the delay from appeal. 
But those courts that have struck down “pledges or promises” clauses in state 
judicial canons since White have recognized that these risks do not justify 
prohibiting pledges or promises altogether, except perhaps specific promises 
about how a particular case will be decided.77 The same is true of a prosecutor’s 
speech about pending cases during a campaign. Such speech may taint the views 
of potential members of the venire. It may make the trial judge’s task more 
difficult in weeding out potential jurors who have read about the case or already 
formed an opinion about the defendant. It may require a change of venue. But, 
at a minimum, the lesson of White is that, regarding campaign speech, the mere 
potential of added burdens to the state is not a sufficiently compelling 
justification to survive strict scrutiny. 
A second possible way to distinguish White from the Nifong matter is the 
type of election involved; that is, one might argue that judicial elections are 
different than elections in the legislative and executive branches of government, 
and that prohibitions on speech that might be permissible in one forum might 
be impermissible in another. Indeed, Justice Ginsburg in White accused the 
majority of taking an “election is an election” approach to constitutional 
 
 74. See id. at 815–17 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 75. Cf. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(B)(10) (1999) (“A judge shall not, 
with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court, make pledges, 
promises or commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial performance of the adjudicative 
duties of the office.”). 
 76. See Pa. Family Inst., Inc. v. Celluci, 489 F. Supp. 2d 447, 456–57 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (summarizing 
cases since White and issuing a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of Pennsylvania’s 
“pledges or promises” clause); see also Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Ky. Judicial Conduct 
Comm’n, 388 F.3d 224, 228 (6th Cir. 2004) (denying a stay of injunction prohibiting enforcement of 
Kentucky “pledges or promises” clause, and agreeing that such clause was a de facto “announce” clause 
in disguise). 
 77. See Ind. Right to Life, Inc. v. Shepard, 463 F. Supp. 2d 879, 889 (N.D. Ind. 2006) (“[T]here is no 
real distinction between announcing one’s views on legal or political issues and making statements that 
commit, or ‘appear to commit,’ a judicial candidate with respect to cases, controversies, and issues that 
are likely to come before the court.” (quoting N.D. Family Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 
1021, 1042 (D.N.D. 2005))). A canon that prohibited judges or judicial candidates from making 
commitments to “certain results in particular cases” would be more narrowly tailored to accommodate 
speech. 
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analysis.78 She argued that judicial elections are indeed different from elections 
for legislative or executive office because the populace is not choosing a 
candidate who would act at their behest, but rather is choosing a magistrate 
who would act as a neutral, removed from “partisan fray.”79 In his majority 
opinion Justice Scalia declined to address directly the question of whether the 
First Amendment allows greater regulation of judicial campaigns than of other 
elective offices,80 but stated that “even if” this were true, the Minnesota canon 
failed strict scrutiny.81 Thus, the important lesson of White is that if there is a 
relevant distinction between judicial elections and legislative or executive 
elections, attorneys running for legislative or executive office (like Nifong) are 
entitled to more deference than judges, not less.82 
In considering whether Gentile is still good law with respect to elected 
prosecutors following White, it may be helpful to consider a recent example of 
judicial speech that was determined to be protected by the First Amendment. In 
Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Wilkerson, the Supreme 
Court of Mississippi declined to impose sanctions on a sitting judge whose 
comments in a letter to the editor of a newspaper (and subsequently during a 
radio interview) took a position against gay-rights legislation.83 The sitting judge 
indicated that homosexuality was a mental “illness” and that in his opinion gays 
“belong in mental institutions.”84 The Judicial Conduct Commission 
recommended that the judge be sanctioned for conduct “that cast[s] doubt on 
the judge’s capacity to act impartially.”85 The Supreme Court of Mississippi, 
citing White, declined to sanction the judge, ruling that the judge’s comments 
were constitutionally protected and that the requested discipline would violate 
the First Amendment.86 The court rejected the state’s interest in the 
“impartiality” of jurists as justifying the restraint on Wilkerson’s speech because 
a motion to recuse any judge who revealed such anti-gay bias would more 
narrowly satisfy the state’s compelling interest in an impartial judiciary.87 Quite 
simply, if such comments by a sitting judge about homosexuality are protected 
after White, it seems hard to imagine that many of the statements that Nifong 
made to the media about the Duke lacrosse investigation would not be similarly 
protected had Nifong raised a First Amendment defense in his disbarment 
proceeding. 
 
 78. White, 536 U.S. at 805. 
 79. Id. at 806–07. 
 80. Id. at 783. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Cf. Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 83. 876 So. 2d 1006 (Miss. 2004). 
 84. Id. at 1008. 
 85. Id. at 1009 (quoting MISS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4(A)(1) (2002)). 
 86. Id. at 1013. 
 87. Id. at 1015 (“We find no compelling state interest in requiring a partial judge to keep quiet 
about his prejudice so that he or she will appear impartial.”). 
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IV 
DO MODEL RULES 3.6 AND 3.8(F) SURVIVE STRICT SCRUTINY AFTER WHITE? 
If White controls and the court applies strict scrutiny for the speech of 
elected prosecutors, then there is ample room to argue that no compelling 
government interest is served by certain provisions in Model Rules 3.6 and 
3.8(f). A restraint on speech will survive strict scrutiny only if “the restriction 
operate[s] without unnecessarily circumscribing protected expression.”88 
A. Potential Infirmities in Model Rule 3.6 
As noted above, one could argue that states may not restrict the political 
speech of elected prosecutors unless such speech presents a “clear” or 
“imminent” threat to ongoing judicial proceedings. Such an attorney 
disciplinary standard is already in effect in many states.89 Moreover, even if the 
“substantial risk” standard of Model Rule 3.6 survives White, Comment [5] to 
Model Rule 3.6 essentially creates a presumption that certain topics pose a 
substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding. 
Two topics listed in Comment [5] seem particularly suspect under true strict-
scrutiny analysis. 
The first dubious “off-limits” topic is the “identity of witnesses.”90 What 
compelling government interest justifies precluding a prosecutor from 
identifying the witnesses to criminal proceedings? Arguably, public 
identification could invade the individual’s privacy or subject a witness to 
possible intimidation prior to trial. However, even if those interests are 
compelling, this limitation is not narrowly tailored to serve either of them. 
Identifying a witness is presumptively prejudicial regardless of what type of a 
criminal proceeding the witness is involved in (for example, larceny or rape), 
regardless of whether the witness has consented to his or her name’s being 
disclosed (for example, a corporate whistleblower who has already given 
statements to the media), and regardless of whether the identification occurs six 
months prior to trial or six hours. Imagine the case of the victim of a vicious 
home invasion, beating, and robbery in which the victim identified the 
perpetrator from the hospital bed. Read literally, Model Rule 3.6(a) Comment 
[5] would prohibit the prosecutor from announcing to the media that “John 
Jones was attacked at gunpoint in his home last night and is in critical condition, 
but is expected to recover and be able to testify at trial.” Because the victim is 
also a witness, such a statement would violate the literal terms of the comment. 
Although there may be circumstances in which the prosecutor may choose for 
strategic or policy reasons to withhold the name of a crime victim,91 there 
 
 88. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 54 (1982). 
 89. See supra note 12. 
 90. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a) cmt. [5](1) (1994). 
 91. Many state statutes prohibit law enforcement officials from releasing the name of sexual-
assault victims. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 293 (2007); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50-b (Consol. 2007). 
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appears to be no categorical reason to preclude it in all circumstances. 
Certainly, the identity of the victim–witness will eventually be revealed in court. 
Comment [5] also includes in the list of presumptively prejudicial material 
any public comment regarding the “identity or nature of physical evidence 
expected to be presented.”92 This too may be overbroad. A literal reading of the 
comment would prevent a district attorney from commenting that an alleged 
victim suffered severe physical injuries, assuming that this evidence was 
expected to be presented at trial (for example, in an assault case that the alleged 
victim suffered a stab wound, or in a rape case that the alleged victim suffered 
scratching, bruising, and vaginal swelling). It would also prohibit a prosecutor 
from announcing to the media that, upon completion of a lengthy narcotics 
investigation, police had seized 200 kilograms of high-purity cocaine—or that a 
terrorist plot aimed at JFK airport was thwarted and a truckload of explosives 
was uncovered. It would be rare indeed to find a prosecutor in this country who 
did not think that statements like these are critical to informing the public about 
dangerous activity afoot in the community. “The public has a right to know 
about threats to its safety and measures aimed at assuring its security.”93 
Certainly, it is not uncommon for prosecutors or police to display seized 
evidence at a press conference announcing an arrest or indictment, such as a 
large cache of narcotics, seized weapons, or other contraband. The only 
conceivable justification for prohibiting such speech is that, once the public 
learns of the presence of physical evidence, it may reach conclusions about the 
guilt of the defendant even if that same evidence is later suppressed or not 
introduced at trial. But again, the limitation on Model Rule 3.6 is not narrowly 
tailored to meet even this legitimate government objective. The limitation 
applies whether the prosecutor mentions physical evidence inextricably linked 
to the defendant (“the defendant’s fingerprints were found at the scene”) or 
generic evidence seized during the investigation but not necessarily tied by 
circumstances or forensics to a named defendant (“the perpetrator, in his haste 
to get out of the bank, left a bag of money at the door”). The rule simply does 
not distinguish between theses two very different types of situations. 
Furthermore, the rule says nothing about timing. If a statement about 
physical evidence seized is made soon after arrest and well before trial, it is 
unlikely to have any effect on the proceedings—even if the physical evidence is 
later suppressed.94 Individual voir dire of potential jurors prior to trial may serve 
 
Even in states that have not enacted such express prohibitions, prosecutors routinely decline to release 
the name of rape victims in order to encourage reporting and to protect the victim’s privacy. 
 92. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a) cmt. [5](3). 
 93. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a) cmt. [1]. 
 94. “That time soothes and erases is a perfectly natural phenomenon.” Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 
1025, 1034 (1984) (ruling that when the trial took place four years after allegedly prejudicial publicity, 
the trial court did not commit manifest error in finding the jury impartial). 
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to screen out citizens who have heard or seen public reports of the case.95 It is 
notable that the precursor to Model Rule 3.6, ABA Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility DR 7-107, allowed an attorney associated with a criminal 
investigation to make public comment “at the time of [the] seizure, [about] a 
description of the physical evidence seized, other than a confession, admission, 
or statement.”96 
In addition, Model Rule 3.6 harbors several lurking vagueness problems. In 
the list of topics that “ordinarily” will result in substantial prejudice contained 
in Comment [5], subparagraph (1) refers to “the character . . . reputation or 
criminal record of a party, suspect . . . or witness,” and subparagraph (2) refers 
to the “existence or contents of any confession . . . or statement” given by a 
defendant or suspect, or the failure of one or the other to give such a 
statement.97 These subparagraphs relate back to Model Rule 3.6(a); that is, 
statements about these topics are only improper if they pose a substantial risk 
of prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding.98 However, the word “suspect” is 
capable of at least two possible constructions. The word “suspect” could have 
been placed in the rule for timing reasons; during an investigation it is 
impermissible to discuss the confession of a suspect, and after an indictment it is 
impermissible to discuss the confession of a charged defendant. Or the rule 
could be suggesting that it is impermissible to discuss the confession or criminal 
record of a suspect, regardless of whether that person ends up being indicted, if 
the discussion poses a risk of prejudicing the proceedings against other 
defendants. Neither the rule nor its comments shed any light on which of these 
two constructions is correct. 
Imagine the case of an armed bank robbery committed by three 
perpetrators. One of the suspects is shot and killed by police as he flees the 
bank and dies at the scene. Could the prosecutor, consistent with Model Rule 
3.6, talk to the media about the prior criminal record or deathbed confession of 
that deceased accomplice? This is more than a rhetorical question. Nifong made 
several statements to the media that were disparaging of the Duke lacrosse 
team generally, including criticizing its players for being “hooligans” and for 
failing to come forward with information.99 Yet only three of these players were 
indicted.100 When one reads the disciplinary opinion and the transcript of the 
hearing order, one cannot help but be left with the impression that the panel 
 
 95. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1044 (1991) (Kennedy, J.) (suggesting that the 
length of time before the trial and the size of the county population are important factors to consider in 
determining whether the “substantial likelihood of material prejudice” standard is met). 
 96. See ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR-7-107(C)(7) (1969). 
 97. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a) cmt. [5](1) (emphasis added). 
 98. See Devine v. Robinson, 131 F. Supp. 2d 963, 970 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (“[R]ead in the context of the 
entire rule, subparagraph (b) is easily understood as relating back to subparagraph (a).”). 
 99. North Carolina State Bar Disciplinary Commission Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order of Discipline § Findings of Fact (19), (40), N.C. State Bar v. Michael B. Nifong, No. 06 
DHC 35 (July 24, 2007). 
 100. See Shaila Dewan, 3rd Duke Lacrosse Player Is Indicted in Rape Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 
2006, at A16. 
04__CASSIDY__CONTRACT PROOF.DOC 11/18/2008  11:39:56 AM 
Autumn 2008] THE PROSECUTOR AND THE PRESS 83 
believed Nifong had impermissibly tainted the reputation of the entire Duke 
lacrosse program.101 Is it permissible to discipline Nifong for comments related 
to suspects who were never indicted and therefore could not have had their 
adjudicatory proceedings tainted? What “compelling” interest does the state 
have in preventing a prosecutor from discussing alleged “hooliganism” of 
varsity athletes at an elite university or their tendency to stick together in the 
face of adversity? 
The public-records safe-harbor in Model Rule 3.6(b) is also subject to a 
vagueness objection. Model Rule 3.6(b) contains a list of matters that an 
attorney “may state” to the media during a pending judicial proceeding, 
“[n]otwithstanding” the prohibitions in paragraph (a).102 That is, if the subject of 
a media statement falls within the safe harbor of paragraph (b), an attorney may 
discuss it even if the matter poses a substantial likelihood of materially 
prejudicing the proceeding.103 One of the topics listed in the safe-harbor 
provision of Model Rule 3.6(b) is “information contained in a public record.”104 
If the matter the prosecutor discusses with the media is already in the “public 
record,” it does not constitute an ethical violation for the prosecutor to repeat 
the matter to the press.105 For example, it is ordinarily improper for a prosecutor 
to refer publicly to the prior criminal record of the accused.106 But if the 
prosecutor files a written bail request in court that details the defendant’s 
criminal past in support of an argument for dangerousness, that past has 
become part of a “public record” and is thereafter open for official comment. 
But what does “public record” mean? Does it mean information contained 
in an official, publicly available government record? Or does it mean 
information that is already in the public domain, regardless of how it got there? 
This is a critical distinction. One could certainly argue that the government does 
not have a compelling state interest in preventing a prosecutor from repeating 
what is already in the public domain. The cat is already out of the bag. On the 
other hand, one could argue that the mere act of repeating a contention made 
publicly by others strengthens the public’s perception of the credibility of the 
allegations, especially when the emphasis comes from a government official 
with inside information about the case. 
 
 101. See Transcript of Disciplinary Commission Hearing at p.19–20, Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (June 
16, 2007) (“Order of Discipline”) (describing the victims of Mike Nifong’s misconduct as “the three 
young men to start with, their families, the entire lacrosse team and their coach, Duke University, [and] 
the justice system in North Carolina and elsewhere”) (emphasis added). 
 102. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(b). 
 103. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. [4] (“Paragraph (b) identifies specific 
matters about which a lawyer’s statements would not ordinarily be considered to present a substantial 
likelihood of material prejudice, and should not in any event be considered prohibited by the general 
prohibitions of paragraph (a).”); see also Devine, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 970 (stating that a plausible 
interpretation of Illinois Rule 3.6 is that, if the subject matter of a statement falls both within the safe-
harbor provision and a list of matters ordinarily likely to present a risk of serious prejudice, the 
statement is permissible). 
 104. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(b)(2). 
 105. Id. 
 106. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a) cmt. [5](1). 
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In the Nifong case, the North Carolina Disciplinary Commission had the 
opportunity to address this important distinction, but failed to do so. For 
example, the disciplinary complaint alleged that Nifong violated N.C. Rule 3.6 
by revealing to Newsweek in April 2006 that the examining nurse at Duke 
University Hospital concluded that the accuser had suffered injuries consistent 
with sexual assault.107 The Disciplinary Commission included this count in one of 
its findings of improper comment by Nifong,108 even though the same statement 
was recounted by Assistant District Attorney David Saacks in an Application 
for a Nontestimonial Identification Order (cheek swabbings for DNA) 
submitted to the Durham Superior Court on March 23, 2006.109 Nifong defended 
the disciplinary complaint on this count by alleging that the nurse’s conclusions 
were matters contained in a public record, but the Disciplinary Commission in 
its final order failed even to discuss this defense.110 
Similarly, Nifong was disciplined for commenting to the media on the status 
of DNA tests that were being performed on items taken from the accuser, the 
alleged crime scene, and samples taken from suspects pursuant to judicial order. 
In May 2006, Nifong stated to a television news reporter, “My guess is that 
there are many questions that many people are asking that they would not be 
asking if they saw the results,” and, “They’re [DNA reports] not things that the 
defense releases unless they unquestionably support their positions.”111 In fact, 
DNA tests results at that time did not “unquestionably” support the defense 
position. Between May 4 and May 9, 2006, DNA Security112 learned that two 
 
 107. Amended Complaint, supra note 5, at ¶ 65. 
 108. North Carolina State Bar Disciplinary Commission Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order of Discipline §§ Findings of Fact (39), Conclusions of Law (a), N.C. State Bar v. 
Michael B. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (July 24, 2007). 
 109. Durham County Superior Court Nontestimonial Identification Order, N.C. State Bar v. 
Michael B. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (Mar. 23, 2006) (on file with author). The SANE (Sexual Assault 
Nurse Examiner) report, completed on March 14, 2005, noted that the alleged victim had nonbleeding 
scratches on her heel and knees, and “diffuse edema of the vaginal walls,” that is, swelling. See The 
Johnsville News, Duke Lacrosse Scandal: Nifong Lies & Deception, http://johnsville.blogspot.com/ 
2006/06/duke-lacrosse-scandal-nifong-lies.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2008). The SANE nurse met with 
investigators on March 16, 2006, and March 21, 2006, to further explain her examination report and to 
review her assessment of the alleged victim’s appearance and demeanor in the early morning hours 
after the purported attack. In these interviews, the SANE nurse told the investigator that the accuser’s 
swelling, scratches, statements of pain, hysterical demeanor, and tenderness to the touch were in her 
view consistent with sexual assault. See STUART TAYLOR, JR. & KC JOHNSON, UNTIL PROVEN 
INNOCENT 33–35, 38, 47 (2007). The Application for Nontestimonial Identification Order dated March 
23, 2006—after these interviews were conducted but before Nifong’s public statements on this subject—
purported to summarize both the SANE examination report and the subsequent interviews. Durham 
County Superior Court Nontestimonial Identification Order, Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (Mar. 23, 2006) 
(on file with author). 
 110. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Answer ¶ 56, Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (Feb. 28, 2007). 
 111. North Carolina State Bar Disciplinary Commission Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order of Discipline § Findings of Fact (61), Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (July 24, 2007). 
 112. DNA Security is a private forensic laboratory located in Burlington, North Carolina that was 
capable of performing “Y chromosome DNA testing,” a more sophisticated form of DNA test that was 
not capable of being performed by the North Carolina state laboratory in 2006. See Robert P. 
Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The Critical 
Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257, 287 (2008). 
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false fingernails seized from the house where the lacrosse party occurred (one 
in the bathroom trash and one in a bedroom of the house on a computer) each 
harbored DNA that was not inconsistent with DNA samples taken from Duke 
lacrosse players.113 The report from DNA Security was turned over to defense 
attorneys on May 12, 2006, and on that very afternoon counsel for one of the 
defendants held a press conference to announce to the media that no DNA 
from any lacrosse player was found on specimens taken from the accuser’s 
person at the hospital.114 
Nifong defended the above statements to the media on the grounds that the 
DNA aspect of the investigation had “already become a subject of media 
attention” and he was just responding to questions the media “asked about 
information received from other sources.”115 However, the Commission’s final 
order sanctioned Nifong for these public comments, without ever addressing 
whether they were justified by matters already in the public domain.116 
Undoubtedly the Commission was motivated by the potentially misleading 
nature of Nifong’s DNA comments, especially in light of later revelations that 
he had suppressed exculpatory evidence by directing DNA Security personnel 
to omit from their report the fact that DNA from four unidentified males (not 
lacrosse players) was found on rape-kit items swabbed from the accuser on 
March 14, 2006.117 But Nifong was not charged with making false or misleading 
public statements about DNA; he was charged with making statements that 
posed a substantial risk of prejudicing proceedings, a charge that contains a 
specific safe harbor for matters already in the public domain. It is difficult to 
ascertain how an oblique reference to the existence of information not released 
by defense counsel risks prejudicing future adjudicatory proceedings when the 
information is not identified with specificity and when there has already been 
substantial public discussion of the general topic. 
 
 113. See North Carolina v. Evans, 06 CRS 5581-5583, 4331–36, Defendants’ Motion to Compel 
Discovery: Expert D.N.A. Analysis, 9–10 (Dec. 13, 2006), available at http://www.newsobserver.com/ 
content/news/ crime_safety/duke_lacrosse/20061213_dukelacrosse.pdf). 
 114. Aaron Beard, No Link to Duke Players after 2nd Test, BRADENTON HERALD, May 14, 2006, at 
5; see STUART TAYLOR, JR. & KC JOHNSON, UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT 220–23 (2007). This statement 
by defense counsel followed defense appearances in early April after a first round of tests performed by 
the State Bureau of Investigations (SBI) revealed no semen, blood, or saliva in vaginal swabs taken 
from the accuser. See Today Show (NBC television broadcast Apr. 11, 2006), 2006 WLNR 6110285 
(statement by defense attorney Wade Smith that “no DNA from any young man tested was found 
anywhere on or about the body of this woman”). 
 115. Defendant’s Motion Dismiss and Answer ¶ 44, Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (Feb. 28, 2007). 
 116. North Carolina State Bar Disciplinary Commission Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order of Discipline §§ Findings of Fact (61), Conclusions of Law (a), Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 
(July 24, 2007). The final order of discipline further glosses over this difficult “public domain” issue by 
concluding that Nifong’s impermissible comments were made in “May, 2006” without reference to any 
particular date in May. North Carolina State Bar Disciplinary Commission Amended Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order of Discipline § Findings of Fact (61), Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (July 24, 
2007). 
 117. Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False Identifications: A 
Fundamental Failure to “Do Justice,” 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1137, 1359–60 (2007). 
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Thus far, only the state of Maryland appears to have grappled with the 
appropriate definition of “public record” in the safe harbor provision of its 
equivalent to Model Rule 3.6. In Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland 
v. Gansler, an elected State’s Attorney was disciplined for misconduct in several 
high-profile murder cases.118 During the course of four investigations and 
prosecutions, Gansler made a variety of comments to the media during press 
conferences relating to physical evidence collected at a crime scene, confessions 
obtained from suspects, the prior criminal records of the accused, and plea 
agreements offered to the defendants. All of these topics are presumptively 
prejudicial under the Maryland version of Model Rule 3.6 Comment [5].119 The 
Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland brought misconduct charges 
against Gansler and found after a hearing that all these comments violated the 
Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct corresponding to Model Rule 3.6 
(Maryland Rule).120 
On review, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that the safe-harbor 
provision in the Maryland Rule allowing comments about information that 
could be found in the public record was sufficiently vague to justify many of the 
prosecutor’s comments.121 Many details concerning seized evidence, confessions, 
and prior criminal records had already been leaked by others (presumably the 
police) and reported in newspapers before the district attorney commented on 
them. The court noted that the broad interpretation of the public-records safe 
harbor would allow comment both on any matters that had previously been 
discussed in a public forum, including newspaper and television reports, and on 
all information available from official government records and court records.122 
The court therefore reversed the professional discipline of Gansler respecting 
several counts of the misconduct complaint. It affirmed a finding that Gansler 
violated the Maryland Rule in only two respects: by stating his opinion 
regarding the guilt of several defendants and by commenting on previously 
undisclosed confessions, evidence, and guilty-plea offers.123 The court noted that 
for future cases, however, it would restrict the public-record safe harbor under 
the Maryland Rule to that information accessible in public governmental 
records.124 It stressed that extrajudicial comments, especially those made by 
prosecutors, directly thwart the goal of having the defendant tried by an 
impartial jury that has heard as little as possible about the case. 
 
 118. Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Gansler, 835 A.2d 548 (Md. 2003). 
 119. MD. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. [5]. 
 120. Gansler, 835 A.2d at 552. 
 121. Id. at 566–67. 
 122. Id. at 567. 
 123. Id. at 569–70, 573. 
 124. Id. at 568–69. 
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B. Potential Infirmities in Model Rule 3.8(f) 
As for the limitations on extrajudicial comments posed by Model Rule 
3.8(f), it is also doubtful whether this provision would survive strict scrutiny if 
challenged on First Amendment grounds after White, at least as applied to an 
elected prosecutor speaking during a campaign. Is protecting the reputation of 
the accused, over and above the integrity of the proceedings, a compelling 
government interest? If the defendant is innocent, an obviously compelling state 
interest in limiting a prosecutor’s speech lies in protecting an accused from an 
erroneous guilty finding that may result if public sentiment becomes inflamed 
prior to trial. But that interest is served by Model Rule 3.6, which addresses the 
potential effect of speech on the adjudicatory proceedings. If the defendant is 
guilty, no compelling government interest is served by protecting the defendant 
from public opprobrium for his conduct. Retribution is one of the legitimate 
aims of the criminal law, and retribution is served when citizens band together 
to condemn behavior that violates societal norms.125 
Conceivably, the state might have an interest in protecting defendants later 
found innocent through acquittal or the dismissal of criminal proceedings from 
having their reputations impaired before they reenter society. But, in this 
situation, vindication by acquittal or dismissal is at least one step toward 
repairing any damage to reputation resulting from indictment and media 
comment. More important, however, the innocent defendant has a potential 
civil recourse against the prosecutor who disparages his reputation in the media 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983126 (deprivation of a liberty interest under color of state 
law).127 The Supreme Court could consider the availability of this remedy a 
sufficiently adequate deterrent to obviate the need for a broad prohibition of a 
prosecutor’s speech. 
On October 5, 2007, David Evans, Collin Finnerty, and Reade Seligmann 
filed a civil complaint against Nifong as well as thirteen other state and 
municipal employees and entities, including the Durham Police Department.128 
Nifong himself is named in eight counts of this complaint, including federal 
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for improper public statements and state tort 
claims for malicious prosecution, obstruction of justice, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.129 The complaint, which requests unspecified 
 
 125. See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 62–63 (W.D. Halls, trans., 1984) 
(“[Punishment] serves only very incidentally, to correct the guilty person or to scare off any possible 
imitators. . . . Its real function is to maintain inviolate the cohesion of society by sustaining the common 
consciousness in all its vigour.”). 
 126. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). 
 127. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 276–78 (1993) (prosecutors are entitled only to 
qualified good-faith immunity in suits involving conduct that is not quasi-judicial in nature, including 
allegedly inflammatory statements to the press); Marx v. Gumbinner, 855 F.2d 783, 791 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(a prosecutor does not receive absolute immunity, and could be civilly liable for a due-process violation 
under § 1983, for conduct in issuing a defamatory press release). 
 128. See Evans v. City of Durham, Civ. Action No. 07-739 (M.D.N.C., Oct. 5, 2007), available at 
http://media.mgnetwork.com/ncn/pdf/071005_duke.pdf. 
 129. Id. 
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compensatory and punitive damages, is presently pending in the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. The enormity of the 
potential civil recovery against Nifong and the City of Durham may itself act as 
such a powerful deterrent to future acts of false, misleading, or defamatory 
speech by prosecutors across this country as to make the prohibition of Model 
Rule 3.8(f) unnecessary. 
Note that Model Rule 3.8(f) prohibits speech that tends to heighten public 
condemnation of the accused unless such speech is both “necessary to inform 
the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor’s action” and serves “a 
legitimate law enforcement purpose.”130 Unless condemning speech meets both 
of these tests, it is prohibited. The problem with this language is that it turns 
strict scrutiny on its head. Model Rule 3.8(f) demands that a bar disciplinary 
committee assess the importance of the speech in determining whether it is 
unethical. But under White, where political speech is concerned, the court will 
demand a compelling reason for the restriction—not a compelling reason for 
the speech. Political speech is presumed to be at the core of First Amendment 
protections, and the court does not undertake an individual weighing of the 
value of words spoken in the electoral context. By allowing only extrajudicial 
condemning speech that is “necessary,” the rule risks chilling political speech 
that is protected by the First Amendment. 
Imagine a murder case in which the defendant killed multiple victims in a 
particularly horrific manner. Assume further that the trial and sentencing are 
complete, that the defendant’s first appeal has been exhausted, and that the 
defendant is serving a mandatory life sentence in prison. The District Attorney, 
who personally handled the case, is up for reelection. She grants a television 
interview in which she describes the case as the most difficult of her career, she 
replays some of the more horrific elements of the crime, she reveals that she 
still has nightmares about the crime, and she characterizes the defendant as an 
“animal” and “pure evil” and deserving of the full condemnation of society. She 
also urges the legislature to reinstate the death penalty in her jurisdiction. The 
trial and sentencing are over; these comments cannot reasonably be viewed as 
posing a substantial risk of prejudicing adjudicatory proceedings. But if Model 
Rule 3.8 imposes restrictions on prosecutors above and beyond those imposed 
by Model Rule 3.6,131 these comments certainly seem to heighten public 
 
 130. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f) (2002). 
 131. Id. The ABA Comment on Rule 3.8(f) states that this rule is “supplemental” to other rules 
governing attorney speech, but also says that comments that do not violate the safe harbor of 3.6(b) or 
the fair-reply provision of 3.6(c) do not violate 3.8(f). Thus, a prosecutor who makes a statement to the 
press about information contained in a public record (such as the prior criminal history of the accused) 
presumably cannot be disciplined under Model Rule 3.8(f)—even if this statement heightens public 
condemnation of the accused—if the public comment otherwise complies with the safe-harbor 
provision of Rule 3.6(b). But there is an ambiguity here. What does Model Rule 3.8(f) add if the safe 
harbor of Model Rule 3.6(b) and (c) are allowed? In Devine, the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois declared there “may” be no conflict between these rules. See Devine v. 
Robinson, 131 F. Supp. 2d 963, 971 (N.D. Ill. 2001). But what about the traditional rule of statutory 
construction that the more-specific rule trumps the more general? Model Rule 3.6 applies to all 
04__CASSIDY__CONTRACT PROOF.DOC 11/18/2008  11:39:56 AM 
Autumn 2008] THE PROSECUTOR AND THE PRESS 89 
condemnation of the accused. What compelling state interest possibly justifies 
censuring that speech? After all, the defendant is entitled to a fair trial, “not a 
friendly public.”132 
In Gentile, the Supreme Court ruled that the “substantial likelihood of 
material prejudice” standard of Nevada Rule 3.6 satisfied the First Amendment 
because it was viewpoint neutral and it “merely postpones the attorneys’ 
comments until after the trial.”133 If Model Rule 3.8 is read to limit a 
prosecutor’s speech without regard to whether it poses a risk to the fairness of 
the proceedings, it may not satisfy rigorous constitutional scrutiny. In fact, one 
of the members of the ABA Ethics 2000 Committee thought that this 1994 
addition to Model Rule 3.8 was “of doubtful constitutional validity.”134 Ohio, the 
state most recently adopting the Model Rules, rejected Model Rule 3.8(f) after 
prosecutors in that state expressed a similar concern.135 Many states that 
otherwise follow the ABA Model Rules do not include a restriction on 
extrajudicial prosecutor speech like that of Model Rule 3.8(f).136 Like Ohio, they 
may have rejected Model Rule 3.8(f) due to constitutional concerns or simply 
because regulating speech of government lawyers is so fraught with the 
difficulties of line-drawing that it is politically impractical. 
Between March 27 and March 31, 2006, Nifong declared to a television news 
reporter that “[w]hat happened here was one of the worst things that’s 
happened since I have become district attorney.”137 He also stated that “[w]hen I 
look at what happened, I was appalled. I think that most people in this 
community are appalled.”138 These statements to the media did not name any 
suspects. They did not refer to physical or forensic evidence, the character or 
reputation of alleged perpetrators, or the expected trial testimony. They were 
 
attorneys, and Model Rule 3.8 applies only to prosecutors. If there is a conflict, traditional rules of 
statutory construction suggest that the more-specific provisions of Model Rule 3.8 should govern. 
 132. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 13, Devine v. 
Robinson, 131 F. Supp. 2d 963 (N.D. Ill. 2001). 
 133. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1076 (1991). 
 134. See ABA Center for Prof’l Responsibility Comm’n on Evaluation of the Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct, Meeting Minutes (Oct. 15–19, 1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/minoct99.pdf. 
 135. See Letter from Mario County Prosecuting Attorneys to Task Force of Ohio Supreme Court 
(Feb. 1, 2006) (on file with author) (“Proposed Rule 3.8 goes far beyond that which is necessary to 
protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial and is thus of questionable constitutional validity.”). 
 136. See ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2007); ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
3.8 (2007); CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2007); FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 
(2008); HAW. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2007); KAN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 
(2007); KY. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2008); MICH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 
(2008); MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2005); MISS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 
(2007); N.M. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 16-308 (2007); OHIO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 
(2007); OR. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2006); TENN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 
(2007); TEX. R. PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.09 (2007); UTAH RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2007); VT. 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2007); W. VA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2007); WIS. 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2006). 
 137. North Carolina State Bar Disciplinary Commission Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order of Discipline § Findings of Fact (33), N.C. State Bar v. Michael B. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 
35 (July 24, 2007). 
 138. Id. 
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simply expressions by a sitting district attorney, running for office, about why he 
viewed the allegations in the case as serious, why the public should be equally 
concerned about them, and why he had chosen to prosecute the case personally 
rather than assign the case to a staff member. Nevertheless, the disciplinary 
commission in North Carolina concluded that these comments “heighten[ed] 
public condemnation of the accused” and included them in its litany of reasons 
for disbarring Nifong.139 It certainly would have been prudent for Nifong to have 
included the words “allegedly” before the words “happened” in these public 
comments;140 however, that omission alone cannot translate protected speech 
into unprotected speech, especially when it occurred prior to the return of DNA 
results, when Nifong may have still entertained a good-faith belief that a sexual 
assault in fact had occurred. The former District Attorney assuredly had a First 
Amendment right to make these particular public comments, and if Model Rule 
3.8(f) is read to preclude them, it is most certainly overbroad.141 
It is also troubling that Model Rule 3.8(f)’s prohibition of speech that 
“heighten[s] public condemnation of the accused” is silent as to the state of 
mind that must be present before a violation may be found.142 Must the 
prosecutor know that his media statements serve no legitimate purpose, know 
that they are not necessary to inform the public about the nature and extent of 
his actions, and either know or intend that they will heighten public 
condemnation of the accused? One member of the ABA Ethics 2000 
Commission suggested that the threshold for discipline under Model Rule 3.8(f) 
should be a “knowing” violation, consistent with Model Rule 3.6.143 But the rule 
was never amended in accordance with this suggestion.144 
 
 139. North Carolina State Bar Disciplinary Commission Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order of Discipline § Conclusions of Law (a), Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (July 24, 2007). 
 140. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. [5] (1994). 
 141. The former District Attorney did not directly challenge North Carolina Rules 3.6 or 3.8 on 
First Amendment grounds, either as applied to him directly or as facially overbroad. See Plaintiff’s 
Motion to Dismiss and Answer, Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (Feb. 28, 2007). With respect to his statements 
regarding the lacrosse case, Nifong claimed that he did not intend to heighten public condemnation of 
the accused and did not intend to substantially prejudice the proceedings. 
Defendant made the statements outlined in paragraphs 12 through 175 of the Amended 
Complaint at a time when there was an ongoing investigation relating to the facts contained in 
the Affidavit attached to the Application for Nontestimonial Identification Order, a copy of 
which is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit ‘A.’ The statements 
made between March 27, 2006 and April 3, 2006, were made at a time when no individual 
suspects had been identified and were an effort by the defendant to reassure the community 
that the case was being actively investigated by the Durham Police Department in an effort to 
obtain assistance in receiving evidence and information necessary to further the criminal 
investigation. 
Id. at 4, ¶10. 
 142. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f) (2002). 
 143. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a) requires that a lawyer “know or reasonably 
should know” that his comments will be disseminated and will pose a substantial risk of material 
prejudice to the proceeding. 
 144. See ABA Center for Prof’l Responsibility Comm’n on Evaluation of the Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct, Meeting Minutes, (October 15–19, 1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/ 
minoct99.pdf. 
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Imagine that upon indicting an alleged serial child rapist the prosecutor 
states that “Pedophilia is a scourge in our society. Preying on innocent children 
is the worst form of evil, and fighting it will be the highest priority of my office. 
I will do everything in my power to ensure that these heinous criminals are 
segregated from society.” Imagine further that the prosecutor thinks there are 
two legitimate law-enforcement purposes for this comment: first, to deter 
would-be criminals from sexually molesting children and, second, to inform the 
public in an election year about how he will exercise his discretion in employing 
scarce law-enforcement resources. If a bar disciplinary board disagrees with the 
prosecutor that the reasons for his public comments are necessary or legitimate, 
but the speaker nonetheless held them in good faith, may the speaker be 
sanctioned for these comments? That is, are “necessity” and “legitimacy” to be 
determined after the fact by the disciplinary board, or from the subjective point 
of view of the speaker? 
This lack of clarity about the state-of-mind requirement for a Model Rule 
3.8(f) violation could seriously chill campaign speech for elected prosecutors. 
For example, a prosecutor may feel that it is a “legitimate law-enforcement 
purpose” to explain to the electorate the reasons for his charging decisions and 
why he is making the prosecution of certain heinous offenses a priority in his 
community, but nonetheless refrain from such speech for fear that a disciplinary 
panel may consider it to have no legitimate purpose other than to heighten 
public condemnation of the accused. That is, prosecutors may be hesitant to 
engage in public discourse about ongoing criminal cases for fear that bar 
overseers will examine the justification for their speech from a purely objective 
perspective after the fact. Candidates should not have to speculate at their peril 
about the contours of a restriction on political speech. Equally worrisome is the 
possibility that disciplinary committees interpreting Model Rule 3.8(f) may not 
consider campaign speech to have any “legitimate law-enforcement purpose” 
whatsoever. If a prosecutor’s freedom to campaign is to be respected, it would 
appear that the threshold for a violation of Model Rule 3.8(f) should at a 
minimum be gross recklessness, which is consistent with the “knew or should 
have known” standard of Model Rule 3.6.145 The rule’s silence on this critical 
intent issue clearly poses a serious problem after White. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
The questions generated in this article are not intended to condone or 
excuse the actions of District Attorney Mike Nifong in the Duke lacrosse 
investigation. His mishandling of this rape case deserves the derision it has 
received from scholars, judges, and leaders of the bar. But the profession paints 
with too broad a brush when it condemns so many of Nifong’s statements to the 
media as impermissible under present disciplinary rules. Gentile is no longer the 
 
 145. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 (2002). 
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only game in town when it comes to an attorney’s statements to the media. The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White requires 
that, when dealing with elected officials and political speech, disciplinary rules 
be both narrowly tailored and narrowly construed in order to survive First 
Amendment scrutiny. The North Carolina Disciplinary Commission’s decision 
in the Nifong matter failed to recognize many of the nuances of Model Rules 
3.6 and 3.8 that deserve serious consideration. 
